Goldman Sachs - Next recession lessons from history

23 June 2017 | 8:41PM EDT
US Economics Analyst
The Next Recession: Lessons from History
n
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n
With the current expansion already the third longest in US history, investors have
begun to look ahead to the next recession. In this week’s Analyst, we ask how
likely the next recession is to come soon and where it is likely to come from.
We start with a historical overview of the causes of recessions. Looking at 33
US recessions since the 1850s, we find that many pre-WW2 recessions
originated in the financial sector, many post-WW2 recessions were caused by oil
shocks and monetary policy tightening, and sentiment-driven swings in
borrowing and investment led to recessions in both eras. A similar IMF study of
the key contributors to 122 advanced economy recessions shows that even
before 2008, financial crises were a fairly common source of modern recessions
too.
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n
n
History offers several lessons about possible sparks for the next recession.
Some common contributors to past recessions look less worrisome today. Two
frequent causes of modern advanced economy recessions—fiscal policy shocks
and weak foreign demand—have generally not been sufficient to tip the US into
recession. In addition, the dominant cause of postwar US recessions—rapid rate
hikes in response to high inflation, often boosted by oil shocks—is less
threatening today due to the anchoring of inflation expectations and the rise of
shale.
Jan Hatzius
(212) 902-0394 | [email protected]
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC
Alec Phillips
(202) 637-3746 | [email protected]
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC
David Mericle
(212) 357-2619 | [email protected]
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC
Spencer Hill
(212) 357-7621 | [email protected]
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC
Daan Struyven
(212) 357-4172 | [email protected]
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC
Karen Reichgott
(212) 855-6006 | [email protected]
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC
Avisha Thakkar
(917) 343-4543 | [email protected]
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC
Nonetheless, history suggests that overly rapid tightening is still a risk, as even
tame tightening cycles have sometimes ended in recession. And the more
timeless drivers of the business cycle—the sentiment-driven swings in both
financial asset prices and borrowing and investment that are often attributed to
“animal spirits”—retain their relevance as recession risks.
Combining lessons from our historical study, our cross-country recession model,
and research on US-specific leading indicators, we develop a recession risk
dashboard for the US economy. The dashboard suggests that recession risk
remains only moderate, highlighting the decline in spare capacity as a rising risk
factor. This reinforces the message from our cross-country recession model,
which now estimates a 1/4 chance of recession over the next two years,
somewhat below the unconditional probability over two years of 1/3 since 1980.
Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. For Reg AC
certification and other important disclosures, see the Disclosure Appendix, or go to
www.gs.com/research/hedge.html.
Goldman Sachs
US Economics Analyst
The Next Recession: Lessons from History
With the economy now back at full employment and the expansion already the third
longest in US history, investors have begun to look ahead to the next recession. The
most immediate question is whether a recession is likely to occur soon, and our answer
is no—while recession risk has risen as spare capacity has evaporated, it remains only
moderate. But a separate question is where the next recession is likely to come from
once it does arrive. If we knew the economy were in recession a year or two from now,
what would be the most likely cause?
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In this week’s Analyst, we look back at a large set of historical recessions in the US and
other advanced economies to identify the key contributors to past recessions. We ask
how much the most common contributors to past recessions should concern us today,
and whether any specific risks seem particularly worrisome at the moment. While
some frequent contributors to postwar recessions such as oil shocks look less
threatening today, others such as declines in financial asset prices, sentiment-driven
investment swings, and too-rapid tightening of monetary policy retain their relevance as
recession risks. Combining lessons from this historical investigation, our cross-country
recession model, and both our own research and academic research on US-specific
leading indicators, we then develop a recession risk dashboard. The dashboard
reinforces our view that recession risk remains only moderate.
A Historical Look at the Causes of Recessions
A starting point in understanding past recessions is to simply look at the contributions
of the various components of GDP during prior downturns. Exhibit 1 shows the
cumulative growth contributions over all quarters included in the NBER-defined
recessions since the introduction of the national accounts. The main lesson is a familiar
one: while consumption has declined more often than not in recessions, investment
spending—including inventories, business fixed investment, and housing—has
accounted for the largest contributions to declines in output. This same stylized fact
holds for a broad international sample of advanced economy recessions.1.
1.
23 June 2017
International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook,” April 2002.
2
Goldman Sachs
US Economics Analyst
Exhibit 1: Investment Usually Dominates Output Declines During Recessions
Percentage points
4
Contributions to GDP Growth During Recessions
2
2
0
0
-2
-2
-4
-4
-6
-8
Personal Consumption
Housing
Net Exports
Total
'49
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Percentage points
4
'53-'54
'57-'58
Nonresidential Fixed Investment
Inventory Investment
Government
-6
-8
'60-'61
'70
'74-'75
'80
'81-'82
'90-'91
'01
'08-'09
Source: Department of Commerce. NBER. Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
We turn next to classifying the most important causes of prior downturns to create a
taxonomy of recessions. To expand our sample, we study all prior US recessions as
defined by an NBER database that includes 33 business cycles back to 1854, shown in
Exhibit 2. Of the 33, 21 occurred before World War 2, when the US economy was much
more frequently in recession, and 12 have occurred since.
Exhibit 2: The US Economy Has Spent Much Less Time in Recession Since WW2
US Recessions
Avg Time in Recession: 42%
Avg Time in Recession: 14%
0
0
1854 1864 1874 1884 1894 1904 1914 1924 1934 1944 1954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004 2014
Note: Gray shading denotes NBER recessions.
Source: NBER. Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
23 June 2017
3
Goldman Sachs
US Economics Analyst
Relying on several historical sources, we identify the key contributors to each
recession.2. Exhibit 3 summarizes our findings. We draw four lessons. First, the most
frequent contributors to modern recessions have been monetary policy tightening and
oil price shocks, with the former in response to inflation that often gained momentum
from the latter. Second, sentiment-driven swings between over-borrowing and heavy
investment followed by deleveraging and investment cutbacks contributed to the two
most recent recessions and also played a role in early recessions, especially during
boom-and-bust cycles of railroad investment. Third, while the financial sector has not
been the origin of as many modern US recessions, it was a very frequent source of
early US recessions. Fourth, fiscal policy shocks have sparked US recessions, but only
in the context of demobilizations from major wars.
Exhibit 3: Major Contributors to Early and Modern US Recessions
Number of instances
35
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30
Number of instances
35
Key Contributors to NBER-Dated US Recessions since the 1850s:
30
25
20
Pre-WW2 Recessions
Post-WW2 Recessions
25
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
0
0
Source: NBER. Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
We can also look beyond US history using a similar taxonomy of the sources of
advanced economy recessions from the IMF.3. The IMF identifies five key contributors
to 122 recessions since 1960: fiscal policy shocks, monetary policy shocks, oil price
shocks, external demand, and financial crises. Their classification is based on statistical
rules-of-thumb and assigns multiple factors to some recessions, but none to others.
This global perspective highlights a couple of additional lessons. First, oil shocks and
monetary policy tightening have become less frequent contributors to recessions
globally in recent decades. Second, even before the Great Recession, financial crises
were a fairly common source of modern advanced economy recessions.
2.
In particular, we use Victor Zarnowitz’s Business Cycles: Theory, History, Indicators, and Forecasting;
Willard Long Thorp’s The Annals of the United States of America; Wesley C. Mitchell’s Business Cycles as
Revealed by Business Annals; the Congressional Research Service Report “The Current Economic Recession:
How Long, How Deep, and How Different From the Past?” by Marc Labonte and Gail Makinen; and sources
specific to individual recessions.
3.
23 June 2017
International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook,” April 2009.
4
Goldman Sachs
US Economics Analyst
Exhibit 4: Financial Crises and Monetary Policy Tightening Were the Most Common Triggers for Recent
Advanced Economy Recessions
Number of instances
Number of instances
80
80
IMF Classification of the Key Contributors to Advanced Economy Recessions
70
70
1960-1985
1985-2007
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
0
0
Total
Recessions
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60
Fiscal Policy
Contractions
Monetary
3ROLF\«
Oil Shocks
External
'HPDQG«
Financial
Crises
Source: IMF. Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
We conclude our historical overview by looking at the overlap between US and foreign
recessions. As Exhibit 5 shows, US recessions coincided with broader global
downturns in the early 1970s, early 1980s, early 1990s, and 2009. But US recessions
have not been synchronized with global recessions in general, and as Exhibit 3 showed,
weaker foreign demand alone has not been sufficient to drag the modern US economy
into recession. Instead, the overlap has generally reflected a common response to a
global oil shock or US problems spilling abroad.
Exhibit 5: Global Recessions Sometimes Begin in the US, but Weaker Foreign Growth Has Not Been
Enough to Tip the US into Recession
Number of recessions
25
Number of Recessions Across 20 OECD Countries
Number of recessions
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
0
1960
0
1970
1980
Note: Gray shading denotes NBER recessions.
1990
2000
2010
Source: IMF. OECD. Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
23 June 2017
5
Goldman Sachs
US Economics Analyst
How Recession Risk Has Changed
How relevant are these historical drivers of recession today, and has the risk of
recession changed even from its lower post-war average? If we define recession as a
decline in output, then recession risk should be mechanically higher today simply
because potential growth is lower. We recently showed that the historical experience of
OECD countries bears this out: as the left side of Exhibit 6 shows, countries with lower
potential growth have unsurprisingly experienced negative growth more frequently. But
the more sensible takeaway is probably that there is nothing sacred about that 0%
growth cutoff. If we instead define recessions based on increases in the
unemployment rate, the probability does not rise in lower potential growth economies,
as shown on the right of Exhibit 6.
Exhibit 6: Lower Potential Growth Raises the Odds of a Technical Recession, but Not a Meaningful One
Percent
10
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9
Percent
10
Probability of Two Consecutive Quarters
of Negative GDP Growth
9
8
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
0
0
0-1%
1-2%
2-3%
3-4%
Potential GDP Growth Rate
>4%
Percent
4.0
3.5
Percent
4.0
Probability of Two Consecutive Quarters of 30bp Increase in
Unemployment Rate
3.5
3.0
3.0
2.5
2.5
2.0
2.0
1.5
1.5
1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
0.0
0.0
0-1%
1-2%
2-3%
3-4%
Potential GDP Growth Rate
>4%
Source: OECD. Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
In fact, many of the common contributors to recessions do not look that worrisome in
the US today. Consider, for example, the five factors identified by the IMF’s taxonomy.
Two of them—external demand shocks and fiscal policy shocks, at least those unrelated
to the end of a major war—have never been large enough to spark a modern US
recession.4. A third—oil shocks—appears much less threatening with the rise of shale,
which makes the impact of price fluctuations on US GDP more balanced and, as we
argued several years ago, limits the potential magnitude of the price shock.
The fourth category, excessive monetary policy tightening, looks at least somewhat less
threatening now than in much of the postwar era because inflation expectations are
better anchored on the Fed’s target and oil shocks are unlikely to provide as much
inflationary momentum. But here history counsels caution against over-confidence:
even relatively modest monetary policy tightening, far less than after the 1970s oil
shocks, contributed to the 1957 and 1960 recessions.
4.
In fact, even accounting for the impact on financial conditions, major modern foreign economic crises have
generally had only limited effects on the US economy. See David Mericle and Daan Struyven, “The Impact of
Foreign Crises on the US: A Ripple or a Wave?”, US Daily, 17 February 2016.
23 June 2017
6
Goldman Sachs
US Economics Analyst
The fifth category, financial sector shocks, is a broad heading covering asset price
collapses as well as banking crises and credit crunches. While the sources of some
19th-century financial crises now appear quaint, others reflect a more timeless factor,
wild fluctuations in asset valuations. Moreover, as we noted above, recessions
originating in the financial sector have actually been fairly common in advanced
economies in recent decades.
Finally, missing from the IMF’s categories is the real economy analogue, swings in
“animal spirits” that have driven cycles of heightened borrowing and investment
followed by deleveraging and investment cutbacks in both early and modern US cycles.
This category too appears equally relevant today.
A Recession Risk Dashboard for the US Economy
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What do these insights suggest about the probability of recession today? Our preferred
tool for answering this question is our cross-country recession model, which we
estimate using real and financial data on 20 advanced economies since 1980. The
model, shown in Exhibit 7, indicates that recession risk has risen, primarily due to the
decline in spare capacity in the US economy. But the model suggests that recession
risk remains only moderate at about 13% on a 1-year horizon (compared to an
unconditional probability of 23% since 1980) and 24% on a 2-year horizon (compared to
an unconditional probability of 34%).
Exhibit 7: US Recession Risk Has Risen, but Remains Only Moderate
Percent
100
Percent
100
US
Current
Next Year
Next 2 Years
90
80
70
US Recession Risk
90
80
70
60
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
0
1980
0
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
23 June 2017
7
Goldman Sachs
US Economics Analyst
To provide a broader view, we develop a US recession risk dashboard, shown below in
Exhibit 8. The dashboard combines insights from three sources: our historical
investigation of recessions; our cross-country recession model; and both our own and
academic research on US-specific leading indicators.
The first row of the dashboard shows two series included in our cross-country recession
model. Stronger growth momentum captured by our current activity indicator signals
lower recession risk, while a more positive output gap indicates higher recession risk.
The second row of the dashboard shows two high-frequency US economic indicators,
consumer expectations from the University of Michigan survey and building permits.
We choose these two because both our own research and a similar exercise by NY Fed
researchers highlight them as high-quality leading indicators. In both cases, lower
values indicate higher recession risk.
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The third row of the dashboard shows private sector net saving from our financial
balances model, an indicator that declined sharply in the run-up to the last two US
recessions, and a measure of business lending standards in the Senior Loan Officer
Opinion Survey, where a higher value indicates that access to credit is tightening.
Together these series help to identify leverage and investment cycles.
The fourth row of the dashboard shows three more variables included in our
cross-country recession model. On the left, a flatter yield curve has historically been the
best market indicator of recession risk, although its interpretation recently has been
complicated somewhat by the impact of quantitative easing. On the right, sharp
declines in home and equity prices have also contributed to past recessions.
The dashboard reinforces the message from our cross-country model that recession risk
remains limited. Of the various indicators, only the moderately positive output gap
signals much risk, and with inflation still quite restrained even this indicator might be
less worrisome than usual. Market attention has focused on the flattening of the yield
curve recently, but the slope remains well above levels that preceded most past
recessions, and the NY Fed’s term spread-based recession probability estimate remains
correspondingly low. And while we have highlighted a few areas of concern for the US
economy recently—in particular auto sales and commercial real estate—these sectors
alone are unlikely to amount to enough to tip the economy into recession.
23 June 2017
8
Goldman Sachs
US Economics Analyst
Exhibit 8: A Recession Risk Dashboard for the US Economy
Percent change, annual rate
10
Percent change, annual rate
10
Percentage points
6
8
8
6
6
4
4
2
2
0
0
-2
-2
-4
-4
-6
-6
-8
-8
-10
1972
-10
1977
1982
1987
1992
1997
2002
2007
2012
Index
120
Index
120
4
2
2
0
0
-2
-2
-4
-4
-6
-6
-8
1973
1983
1993
2003
Percent change, year ago
120
2013
Percent change, year ago
120
Building Permits Authorized
University of Michigan Consumer Expectations
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4
-8
1963
2017
Percentage points
6
FRB/US Output Gap
US Current Activity Indicator
110
110
100
100
90
90
80
80
70
70
60
100
100
80
80
60
60
40
40
20
20
0
0
-20
-20
-40
-40
-60
-60
60
50
50
40
1952
-80
1960
40
1962
1972
Percent of GDP
12
1982
1992
2002
2012
Percent of GDP
12
Private Sector Net Saving
1970
1980
1990
2000
Net percent tightening
100
2010
-80
2020
Net percent tightening
100
SLOOS Business Lending Standards*
10
10
8
8
6
6
4
4
2
2
0
0
-2
-2
-4
-4
-6
-6
80
80
60
60
40
40
20
20
0
0
-20
-8
1947
-8
1957
1967
1977
1987
1997
2007
Percentage points
6
2017
Percentage points
6
Spread Between 10-Year UST Yield and Fed Funds Target
4
4
2
2
0
0
-2
-2
-4
-4
-6
-8
1955
1965
1975
1985
1995
2005
2015
-40
1967
-20
-40
1973
1979
1985
1991
1997
2003
Percent change, year ago
2015
Percent change, year ago
S&P500 (left)
60
2009
Real Home Prices (right)
15
40
10
20
5
0
0
-20
-5
-6
-40
-10
-8
-60
1947
-15
1957
1967
1977
1987
1997
2007
2017
*Questions on business lending standards were not included in the SLOOS survey from 1984-1990.
Note: Gray shading denotes US NBER recessions.
Source: Federal Reserve. University of Michigan. Bloomberg. Census Bureau. OECD. Department of Commerce. Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research.
23 June 2017
9
Goldman Sachs
US Economics Analyst
The Next Recession
Both our cross-country recession model and our US recession risk dashboard suggest
that near-term recession risk remains only moderate. But when the next recession
does come, where will it come from? Our historical analysis offers three main lessons.
First, the dominant cause of postwar US recessions—monetary policy tightening in
response to high inflation often boosted by oil shocks—looks much less threatening in a
world with well-anchored inflation expectations and shale-imposed limits on oil prices.
Second, this does not mean that over-tightening is not a risk; tightening cycles in the
late 1950s were quite tame, but nonetheless ended in recession. Third, the more
timeless drivers of the business cycle—the sentiment-driven swings in both financial
asset prices and borrowing and investment that are often attributed to “animal spirits”—
retain their relevance as recession risks.
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David Mericle
23 June 2017
10
Goldman Sachs
US Economics Analyst
The US Economic and Financial Outlook
(% change on previous period, annualized, except where noted)
2014
2015
2016
(f)
2017
(f)
2018
(f)
2019
(f)
2020
(f)
Q1
2017
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
2018
Q2
Q3
Q4
OUTPUT AND SPENDING
Real GDP
Consumer Expenditure
Residential Fixed Investment
Business Fixed Investment
Structures
Equipment
Intellectual Property Products
Federal Government
State & Local Government
Net Exports ($bn, '09)
Inventory Investment ($bn, '09)
Industrial Production, Mfg.
2.4
2.9
3.5
6.0
10.3
5.4
3.9
-2.5
0.2
-426
58
1.2
2.6
3.2
11.7
2.1
-4.4
3.5
4.8
0.0
2.9
-540
84
0.1
1.6
2.7
4.9
-0.5
-2.9
-2.9
4.7
0.6
0.9
-563
22
0.0
2.1
2.5
3.9
4.2
8.7
2.2
3.9
-0.1
0.2
-604
7
1.6
2.2
2.1
2.3
2.8
1.9
3.0
3.0
1.1
1.9
-612
17
1.7
1.7
1.6
3.0
2.6
2.0
2.4
3.2
1.1
2.2
-646
23
1.2
1.5
1.5
3.0
2.3
1.7
2.0
3.0
1.0
2.0
-686
25
1.0
1.2
0.6
13.7
11.4
28.3
7.2
6.7
-2.1
-0.6
-600
4
2.4
2.5
3.3
-1.5
3.0
5.5
1.4
3.5
1.5
0.1
-605
-5
2.0
2.5
2.4
1.0
2.3
0.5
3.5
2.0
0.3
1.5
-605
12
2.0
2.3
2.3
2.0
2.3
1.5
3.0
2.0
0.5
2.0
-606
15
2.0
2.3
2.0
3.0
2.9
2.0
3.0
3.5
1.5
2.0
-604
15
1.5
2.0
1.9
2.0
2.9
2.0
3.0
3.5
1.5
2.0
-608
17
1.5
2.0
1.8
4.0
2.9
2.0
3.0
3.5
1.5
2.5
-613
17
1.5
2.0
1.8
4.0
2.9
2.0
3.0
3.5
1.0
2.5
-622
20
1.5
1,001
440
4,923
6.1
1,107
503
5,234
4.8
1,177
561
5,440
4.9
1,278
644
5,493
4.9
1,370
707
5,482
3.7
1,460
771
5,539
3.2
1,493
804
5,599
2.3
1,238
619
5,620
5.2
1,269
637
5,467
5.5
1,291
653
5,437
5.2
1,314
668
5,450
3.9
1,336
683
5,462
3.8
1,359
699
5,475
3.7
1,381
715
5,489
3.6
1,403
731
5,503
3.6
1.6
1.7
1.6
0.1
1.8
1.4
1.3
2.2
1.7
1.9
1.9
1.6
1.8
2.0
1.9
2.3
2.3
2.1
2.3
2.4
2.2
2.6
2.2
1.7
1.9
1.8
1.5
1.8
1.7
1.5
1.4
1.7
1.7
1.2
1.7
1.7
1.8
2.1
1.9
2.0
2.2
1.9
2.2
2.2
1.9
6.2
12.0
237
5.3
10.4
228
4.9
9.6
194
4.4
8.6
170
4.2
8.1
119
4.2
8.2
60
4.3
8.4
60
4.7
9.2
182
4.4
8.5
175
4.3
8.4
175
4.2
8.2
150
4.2
8.2
125
4.2
8.1
125
4.2
8.1
125
4.1
8.1
100
-483
-439
-587
-650
-725
-875
-975
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
0.75-1.0 1.0-1.25 1.0-1.25 1.25-1.5
2.40
2.50
2.65
2.75
1.07
1.08
1.08
1.07
111
114
114
116
1.5-1.75
2.90
1.06
117
HOUSING MARKET
Housing Starts (units, thous)
New Home Sales (units, thous)
Existing Home Sales (units, thous)
Case-Shiller Home Prices (%yoy)*
For the exclusive use of [email protected]
INFLATION (% ch, yr/yr)
Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Core CPI
Core PCE**
LABOR MARKET
Unemployment Rate (%)
U6 Underemployment Rate (%)
Payrolls (thous, monthly rate)
GOVERNMENT FINANCE
Federal Budget (FY, $bn)
FINANCIAL INDICATORS
FF Target Range (Bottom-Top, %)^
10-Year Treasury Note^
(XUR ¼ A
Yen ($/¥)^
0-0.25 0.25-0.5 0.5-0.75 1.25-1.5 2.25-2.5 3.25-3.5 3.25-3.5
2.17
2.27
2.45
2.75
3.25
3.60
3.70
1.21
1.09
1.06
1.07
1.10
1.15
1.20
120
120
117
116
120
125
125
1.75-2 2.0-2.25 2.25-2.5
3.00
3.10
3.25
1.05
1.08
1.10
118
119
120
* Weighted average of metro-level HPIs for 381 metro cities where the weights are dollar values of housing stock reported in the American Community Survey.
** PCE = Personal consumption expenditures. ^ Denotes end of period.
Note: Published figures in bold.
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
23 June 2017
11
Goldman Sachs
US Economics Analyst
Economic Releases and Other Events
Estimate
Time
(EDT)
Date
Mon
Jun 26
Wed
Jun 27
Jun 28
For the exclusive use of [email protected]
Fri
Jun 29
Jun 30
Consensus
Last Report
8:30
Durable Goods Orders (May)
-0.7%
-0.6%
-0.8%
Durable Goods Orders Ex-Transport (May)
+0.5%
+0.4%
-0.5%
8:30
Core Capital Goods Orders (May)
+0.6%
+0.3%
+0.1%
8:30
Core Capital Goods Shipments (May)
+0.5%
+0.3%
+0.1%
9:00
Dallas Fed Survey (Jun)
S&P/Case Shiller Home Price Index (Apr)
10:00
Consumer Confidence (Jun)
10:00
Richmond Fed Survey (Jun)
8:30
Advanced Goods Trade Balance (May)
8:30
:KROHVDOH,QYHQWRULHV²3UHO 0D\
10:00
Thu
GS
8:30
10:30
Tue
Indicator
Pending Home Sales (May)
8:30
5HDO*'3²4$QQXDOL]HG 7KLUG
8:30
Personal Consumption (Q1)
8:30
Initial Jobless Claims
8:30
Continuing Claims
n.a.
16.0
17.2
0.50%
+0.5%
+0.9%
116.0
116.0
117.9
n.a.
7
1
-$67.3bn
-$66.0bn
-$67.1bn
n.a.
+0.2%
-0.5%
+0.5%
+0.8%
-1.3%
1.2%
+1.2%
+1.2%
+0.6%
+0.6%
+0.6%
240,000
240,000
241,000
n.a.
1,932,000
1,944,000
8:30
Personal Income (May)
0.30%
+0.3%
+0.4%
8:30
Personal Spending (May)
0.20%
+0.1%
+0.4%
8:30
PCE Price Index (May)
-0.04%
-0.1%
+0.2%
8:30
Core PCE Price Index (May)
+0.09%
+0.1%
+0.2%
9:45
&KLFDJR3XUFKDVLQJ0DQDJHUV¶,QGH[ -XQ
59.4
58.0
59.4
80LFK&RQVXPHU6HQWLPHQW²)LQDO -XQ
94.0
94.5
94.5
10:00
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
23 June 2017
12
Goldman Sachs
US Economics Analyst
Disclosure Appendix
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23 June 2017
13